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Abstract 
 
This paper ethnographically explores the repercussions of the large-scale displacement and resettlement 
of slum-dwellers in the city of Ahmedabad, India, where state-sponsored urban development aimed at 
the creation of a slum-free world-class city is strongly personified around the figure of Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi. Based on ten months’ fieldwork in the slum resettlement site of Sadbhavna Nagar in 
2015–2016, I explore the intricacies of betrayal resulting from world-class city making. First, I suggest 
that infrastructure interventions and futuristic imaginaries invoked dreams of a better future among the 
poor, but resulted in a sense of having been betrayed by both Modi and the state when people were 
physically and discursively excluded from the world-class city. Second, I demonstrate how resettled 
people have engaged in micro-level practices of betrayal by mobilizing middle-class “nuisance talk” 
(Ghertner 2012) to denigrate their new, unwanted neighbors. I argue that the perceived betrayal by the 
state trickles down and translates into a betrayal of neighbors in the resettlement site, reinforcing the 
pre-existing inequalities of caste and religion among the urban poor [Displacement; Urban 
Development; World-Class City; Resettlement; India]. 
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He [Modi] threw us here. Everyone thought he’d do good for Gujarat, he was supposed to do good for 
the poor, but for your [foreigners’] riverfront,2 he divided us [into different resettlement sites]. He took 
the land and wasted money on it. And now look how things are going there [at the riverfront]. Boys and 
girls sitting... A garden... Hotels... He did good work. But as a result, we were divided, we were given 
houses here, in a jungle. If decent houses had been built there [by the river], one room would have been 
enough for us. Just one room, no more than that. (Chandikaben,3 displaced from the Sabarmati 
Riverfront) 
 
Introduction 
The monolithic architecture of the seven slum resettlement sites located in the industrial 
neighborhood of Vatva stems from the city planning department of the Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation (AMC). The unpainted concrete blocks, bounded by a low wall with only a few entrances, 
stand in orderly straight lines reaching toward the horizon. At first sight, the blocks all look identical, 
but a closer look reveals walls painted in pastel shades, religious flags fluttering on roofs and hanging 
from windows, and handmade grilles with intricate designs installed on balconies. Between the blocks, 
men and women sell fish, vegetables, pani puri snacks, sharbat drinks, bangles, and used clothes from 
pushcarts, slowly moving around the concrete labyrinth. The Narol-Vatva Road, with its intermittent 
stream of bicycles, motorcycles, and ramshackle trucks, functions as a border between the two largest 
resettlement sites, colloquially known as “Hindustan” and “Pakistan.” A small police station stands by 
the road, often surrounded by idle-looking men. Over the main entrance of Hindustan, an official sign 
informs visitors: “Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation’s urban poor housing program: Sadbhavna 
Nagar, Ambika Tube, Vatva.”  
In 2005, the Government of India declared Ahmedabad—the most populous city of the Gujarat 
State—to be a “mega city.” The mega city tag elevated Ahmedabad to join the company of New Delhi, 
Kolkata, Mumbai, Chennai, Bangalore, and Hyderabad, and entitled the city to financial assistance for 
aesthetic improvements under the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JnNURM), the 
central government’s city modernization scheme (Desai 2012a; Shatkin 2014). The declaration also 
provided an opportunity for the elites and the middle classes to realize their goals regarding the future 
of Ahmedabad (Desai 2012a; Mehta 2016). An initiative arose to advocate an image of Ahmedabad as a 
4 
 
global city of business and tourism, and to abolish “outsider perceptions” of Ahmedabad as a violent 
city—an understanding spurred, in particular, by the 2002 Hindu–Muslim violence in Gujarat (Desai 
2012a).4 Government officials, business elites, and middle-class citizens aspired to transform 
Ahmedabad into a world-class city, the defining characteristics of which can be summed up as “a 
modern skyline, a high level of efficiency, and an absence of visible signs of poverty” (Ahoobim, 
Goldman, and Mahajan 2014). Becoming a world-class city included forced evictions and demolitions 
of slums to acquire prime land for development purposes (Shatkin 2014). Urban development projects 
of the 2000s—particularly the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project (SRDP), the Kankaria 
Lakefront Development Project (KLDP), and the Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS) project—figured 
importantly in physically reshaping Ahmedabad into a global city of business and tourism. Slum-
dwellers, for their part, were resettled into four-story concrete apartment blocks, mostly built on the 
outskirts of the city.  
This paper examines Ahmedabad’s world-class city interventions and imaginaries from the 
perspective of the displaced and resettled slum-dwellers. It explores how inequality is reproduced 
through state-led neoliberal urban development and micro-level discursive practices. Invoking the 
notion of betrayal, I suggest that world-class city interventions resulted in a perceived betrayal by the 
state, and that in the aftermath of resettlement, the poor themselves came to betray their new, 
unwanted neighbors in claiming moral worth and a positive self-understanding. I argue that this 
manifests in how betrayal by the state trickles down and affects social relationships at the micro level.  
I base my argument on ten months of ethnographic fieldwork5 in the resettlement site of 
Sadbhavna Nagar (“Goodwill City”), located in the industrial neighborhood of Vatva, twelve kilometers 
from the Sabarmati Riverfront. Sadbhavna Nagar was built in 2009 under Basic Services to the Urban 
Poor (BSUP), a component of the Indian government’s JnNURM scheme. The first apartments were 
allotted in February 2010 (Desai 2014, 54). During my fieldwork in 2015–2016, Sadbhavna Nagar 
accommodated ex-slum-dwellers displaced by the SRDP, the KLDP, and the BRTS. Residents 
belonged to various regional, religious, and caste groups including Bhois, Devipujaks, Marathis, 
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Marwaris, Muslims, Sindhis, and Vaghris.6 Being a Hindu-majority area, Sadbhavna Nagar was 
colloquially known as Hindustan. This was in distinction to the adjacent all-Muslim resettlement site of 
Vasant Gajendra Gadkar Nagar, informally known as Pakistan. Due to the Hindu-Muslim co-presence, 
and the fact that the residents were former slum-dwellers, resettlement sites in Vatva had a bad 
reputation in other parts of Ahmedabad—they were considered to be a dangerous no-go zone and 
referred to as a “slum area.” 
The emergence of the notion of “world-class” as a rallying point can be traced back to the 
economic liberalization of India in the early 1990s. Since then, Indian cities have become key arenas in 
the pursuit of controlling the circuits of global capital. In order to attract investments, state and city 
governments engage in a competition to advertise and redesign “financially, infrastructurally, and 
visually appealing” world-class cities (Batra 2008). Closely linked with national pride (Rao et al. 2010), 
the catchword “world-class” has become an effective political tool for city elites, state agencies, and 
corporate actors in their efforts to secure an endorsement for refashioning urban landscapes (Baviskar 
2014, 138). The construction of luxury malls, multiplex movie theaters, rapid transit systems, sports 
stadiums, and flyover bridges redefines the nation’s image as dynamic and globally competitive but also 
entails displacement for the urban poor in the form of slum demolitions, the eviction of hawkers, and 
the commercialization of public space (e.g., Batra 2008; Baviskar 2009; Bhan 2016; Boano, Lamarca, 
and Hunter 2011).  
Asher Ghertner (2011) posits that aesthetic norms play an increasingly important part in defining 
who gets to belong to the world-class city and on what terms. Ghertner’s (2011; 2015) notion of a 
“world-class aesthetic” aptly captures the political rationality according to which a clean, slum-free city 
accelerates economic growth, boosts tourism, and increases the quality of life. Further, this rationality 
shapes the contours of belonging and citizenship, encouraging the emergence of world-class citizens 
that fit in the restructured landscape (Brosius 2010; Ghertner 2011). The rationality of the world-class 
aesthetic is disseminated in the form of discursive practices such as bourgeois “nuisance talk”—
depictions of slums as “zones of incivility that violate normalized codes of urban conduct and 
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appearance” (Ghertner 2012, 1162)—in representations of slum-dwellers as “encroachers” (Bhan 2016) 
and as agents of environmental degradation (Baviskar 2003), and in middle-class activists’ definitions of 
citizens as being distinct from hawkers and other marginal groups (Anjaria 2009). It is also manifested 
materially in the form of demolitions of settlements deemed illegal based on certain visual markers 
(Ghertner 2011; 2015), in crowding the urban poor into “plebeianized” spaces (Chatterjee 2014), and in 
the vast spaciousness, the grey simplicity, and the geometrically clean lines of the new urban spaces. 
I locate my paper in the recent anthropological discussion of subaltern claim-making in the 
aftermath of urban restructuring in India (e.g., Ghertner 2015; Johnston 2014; Ramakrishnan 2014; Rao 
2016). I pay particular attention to how the disenfranchised urban dwellers mobilize the world-class 
aesthetic to deal with the perceived betrayal by the state. As I will show, their mobilizations can have 
untoward consequences for inequality in the city.  
 
Urban restructuring in Ahmedabad 
On India’s 66th Independence Day in 2012, Narendra Modi, then Chief Minister of Gujarat, gave 
a speech at the Sabarmati Riverfront dedicating the newly built riverfront promenade to the residents of 
Ahmedabad. “Before the face-lift, the Sabarmati Riverfront area was a living place for many slum-
dwellers,” Modi declared, leaving unmentioned the fact that the area also hosted a popular market and a 
thriving cloth dyeing industry. “There were thousands of shanties in the area and it had become a den 
for several illegal activities. Relocation had to be carried out to make the riverfront what it is today.” 
Modi went on to criticize the rival party, the Indian National Congress (INC),7 for putting spokes in the 
wheels of the Sabarmati Riverfront Development Project, and pointed out that the project had even 
won a HUDCO8 award for providing housing and rehabilitation facilities for the displaced. “Friends, 
imagine our plight! We decided to provide flats for the people residing in slums but still had to go to 
court!” stated Modi, ridiculing the INC’s as well as the slum-dwellers’ legal opposition to the project. 
The speech was met with a round of vigorous applause from the audience and, finally, the crowd 
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shouted in unison: Bhārat mātā kī jay! Vande mātaram! (Victory to Mother India! I praise thee, Mother!) 
(Modi 2012). Less than two years later, Narendra Modi, a leader of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP), was elected Prime Minister of India.  
In 1997, the AMC established a specific public body, the Sabarmati Riverfront Development 
Corporation Limited (SRFDCL), for the supervision of the riverfront development project (Desai 
2012b). The aim of the project was “to transform Ahmedabad’s historic yet neglected river into a 
vibrant and vital focus for the city” (Sabarmati Riverfront 2013). Narendra Modi played a central part in 
the project as he held power over the appointment of bureaucrats to the SRFDCL’s Board of Directors 
(Desai 2012b). The riverfront project officially displaced approximately 14,000 slum households directly 
and indirectly (Mathur 2012). By 2012, about 11,000 people had been resettled into concrete apartment 
blocks built under the BSUP (Mahadevia, Desai, and Vyas 2014). A majority of the apartments were 
allotted on the basis of a random drawing of lots, breaking apart the existing social networks of slums 
and creating new, often unwilling neighbors in the urban margins. However, Hindus and Muslims were 
mostly resettled into separate sites due to Ahmedabad’s tumultuous history of communal violence 
(Desai 2012b; Desai 2014; Patel, Sliuzas, and Mathur 2015). 
Today, the new Sabarmati Riverfront is strongly personified around the figure of Prime Minister 
Modi, who enjoys immense popularity in Ahmedabad.9 Other notable development initiatives 
associated with him include the KLDP and the construction of the BRTS. The beautification of 
Kankaria, an artificial lake built by Sultan Qutb-ud-din in the fifteenth century, was initiated in 2006. 
During 2006–2007, the Kankaria Lakefront Development Project displaced around 2,000 households 
from four neighborhoods around the lake. The project also evicted marginal vendors, since only 
licensed vendors were allowed to set up kiosks inside the new gated area (Mahadevia, Desai, and Vyas 
2014). According to the official project website, the AMC has developed Kankaria into a “modern 
urban space with best in class entertainment facilities.” This, further, “truly represents Ahmedabad city 
government aim to elevate services to international class and transcend into the modern lifestyle” 
(Kankaria Lakefront 2015). With massive gates, security guards, and entrance fees, Kankaria—
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traditionally a public space open for all—has been transformed into an exclusive area, out of reach for 
the poorest city dwellers. A zoo, a small train, motorboat rides, and hot-air balloon flights ensure that 
demanding visitors are entertained. Moreover, a new BRTS station by the lake makes these recreational 
facilities in the eastern part of the city more accessible for the middle classes coming from the affluent 
west side of Ahmedabad.   
The decision to construct a BRTS bus network, branded locally as Janmarg (“People’s Way”), 
was made by the AMC in 2005 (Datey et al. 2012). Janmarg was modeled after Bogotá’s TransMilenio, 
with dedicated median bus lanes and closed corridors (Mahadevia, Joshi, and Datey 2013). The project 
was highly publicized, and it aspired to remove the negative image associated with the bus system in 
India. According to Mahadevia, Joshi, and Datey (2013, 59), “The Janmarg team has remained 
conscious about the branding and social marketing of the project, especially among the vocal middle 
classes who mainly drive private vehicles. This also fits into the larger politics of the state government 
of showcasing ‘development’ in the city and giving all its credit to the incumbent chief minister.” The 
construction of the bus network started in 2007 and required the widening of roads, which, for its part, 
entailed the demolition of houses and the displacement of hawkers along the BRTS corridor. At least 
1,000 people were displaced (Mahadevia, Desai, and Vyas 2014).  
Of the displaced, those in possession of state-approved identification documents and proof of 
residence were to be resettled in BSUP sites, together with people displaced by other development 
projects in the city. Significantly, the process of resettlement was different for people displaced under 
different development projects and in different phases as no citywide resettlement policy existed. 
Eligibility criteria for resettlement also varied: in some cases, 1976 was used as a cut-off date for 
eligibility, while in others the cut-off date was 2011 (Mahadevia, Desai, and Vyas 2014). The absence of 
a unified resettlement policy has put the displaced people in unequal positions: thousands have been 
forcibly displaced without the possibility of resettlement. Moreover, as Patel, Sliuzas, and Mathur (2015, 
13) point out, not all the people who were allotted apartments possessed eligibility documents. The 
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discriminatory, inconsistent practices have given rise to doubts of corruption among the resettled 
people and aggravated their feelings of unfair treatment by the state.  
 
“Thrown into the jungle”: Discourses of betrayal 
Early one morning in October 2015, I was sitting in an auto rickshaw next to Meena, a middle-
aged Vaghri woman who lived in Sadbhavna Nagar. Meena sold flower garlands every morning from 
four to ten am on the pavement next to the Jamalpur flower market by the Sabarmati river. That 
morning, my husband and I got out of bed at three am and walked to Meena’s. At around 3:30 we had 
already crammed ourselves into the backseat of a rusty, flower-laden auto rickshaw together with 
Meena and were driving toward the city center. Meena’s teenage daughter sat in the front with the 
driver, who seemed to enjoy speeding along a desolate BRTS lane usually occupied by honking buses. 
To his dismay, however, two idle-looking police officers spotted our fragrant vehicle and directed us to 
stop, waving their lathis. The khaki-clad police officers told us that our rickshaw was overcrowded but 
that they would be kind enough to overlook this minor offense if we agreed to pay a hafta (bribe) of 
twenty rupees. Our young driver handed over two wrinkled ten-rupee notes without making any 
objections, and the journey continued. About fifteen minutes later, we arrived by the river and 
unpacked the load on the ground. Customers seeking bright-colored roses, marigolds, and jasmines for 
the city’s numerous temples were soon to arrive.  
As I sat by the river in the darkness, waiting for customers and sipping tea with Meenaben, she 
began to speak of how she used to live just next to where we were sitting. “Modi wanted to make a 
mega city, and that’s why we were thrown into Vatva,” she explained. “I don’t like it, but what can I do?” 
Meenaben’s choice of words—“mega city” and “thrown”—struck a chord with me. Moreover, I found 
it interesting that the person said to be performing the treacherous act of “throwing” (phemknā) in 
Meenaben’s account was none other than Prime Minister Narendra Modi. What can Meenaben’s choice 
of words reveal about how she regards the state and her place in the world-class city?  
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The metaphors of a “jungle” and being “thrown” were commonly used by the residents of 
Sadbhavna Nagar. Ramakrishnan (2014) has studied the use of these tropes in Bawana, a resettlement 
site in Delhi, and calls them “metaphors of marginalization,” which relate to how people make sense of 
their dispossession and negotiate their relationships with the state. The mobilization of a metaphor is a 
political act; a truth claim that encourages certain thoughts and actions while constraining others 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Cresswell 1997). In other words, metaphors construct the reality that they 
describe. The metaphor of being “thrown,” for example, “serves to embed the notion of a second-class 
citizenship, both in the exclusion from urban dwelling and in the abject treatment by the state” 
(Ramakrishnan 2014, 769). In interviews, my research participants described how either the 
government (sarkār) or Modi had thrown them into a “jungle” (jangal), a “village” (gām or gāmv) or a 
“dirty settlement”/“slum” (gandi bastī) (Tarlo 2003; Jervis Read 2012). In their accounts, the Modi-led 
state manifested itself as an indifferent or even hostile state that “throws away.” 
In a departure from Ramakrishnan’s (2014) interviewees in Delhi, residents of Sadbhavna Nagar 
often attributed the act of throwing to an individual actor: Narendra Modi. The feeling of having been 
betrayed by Modi in particular speaks to the authority he holds in the eyes of resettled people—Modi 
was able to betray them precisely because he had the power to evoke dreams of improved living 
conditions and a better future. Poonamben—Vaghri or Devipujak by caste—criticized Modi for 
“running away to Delhi,” and for enjoying his life by traveling all around the world while the poor 
people of Gujarat had been unfairly left to fend for themselves:  
At first, Modi was here, and he was the Chief Minister in Gandhinagar [Gujarat’s capital]. Then he became 
the Prime Minister in Delhi... Now he is visiting new countries and enjoying his life, but what’s the use? 
He never understood the problems of the poor. He got a fine chair and ran away. Anandiben [Patel, the 
Chief Minister of Gujarat from May 2014 to August 2016] visits rural areas for development purposes... 
Why are they not developing urban areas? They are only building bridges... That kind of work. Then they 
just dumped us here like dogs. No one listens [to us].  
 
Poonamben’s equation of slum-dwellers with dogs is noteworthy: stray dogs are a nuisance and a huge 
health problem in India, and are therefore often subject to violence. Her account emphasizes the 
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experiences of helplessness and powerlessness in the face of the local government’s demolition drive 
and the following resettlement process, but it also resists facile interpretations of the displaced as being 
passive victims. Poonamben’s critique of Modi’s foreign travels and the characterization of urban 
development in Ahmedabad as “only building bridges” implies a deep dissatisfaction with the current 
neoliberal order where image, efficiency, and world-class infrastructure come before the well-being of 
the poor. Development is visible and tangible in the new clean and green spaces, but it does not bring 
positive material benefits to the everyday lives of the urban poor. The physical realities of their own 
lives exist in stark contrast to the world-class spaces of the city center (Desai and Roy 2016). Like the 
3D holographic projection used by Modi in his 2014 election campaign, the local government’s official 
success story was starting to look like an illusion—an enticing utopia hovering in the distance, but 
frustratingly out of reach for the poor.  
In my interviews, resettled people’s accounts were infused by traces of anxiety, anger, and a 
feeling of having been betrayed by their officials. Many of my interviewees from the riverfront 
recounted how Modi, the government, or—in some instances, an elusive “they” (Read 2012)—had 
originally promised to allot apartments within two to five kilometers’ radius, but had deceived them in 
this promise. Achalbhai, a thirty-five-year-old bangle salesman whose parents had moved to 
Ahmedabad from the populous northern state of Uttar Pradesh, bore a grudge over having been sent 
“15 kilometers away”: 
They could have given us homes within two kilometers. They could have made a smaller riverfront and 
built some buildings nearby. But instead, they sent us 15 kilometers away. Initially, we were told that we 
would get a house within two kilometers. 
 
Achalbhai’s misconception of resettlement “within two kilometers” of the riverfront can be 
traced back to the original project proposal by the Environmental Planning Collaborative (EPC), a non-
profit urban planning firm. According to the proposal, 15.48 hectares of the reclaimed land by the 
riverfront was to be used for the relocation and rehabilitation of the slum-dwellers to ensure “that none 
of the project affected persons will have to move too far from their present location” (EPC 1998, 34). 
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Information about resettlement on the reclaimed land or in the municipal corporation’s vacant plots 
was then reported in various newspapers, which, according to Desai (2014, 9), were the only sources of 
information for the riverfront dwellers. There was no attempt on the part of the AMC to engage them 
in the planning and implementation of the project (Desai 2014; Patel, Sliuzas, and Mathur 2015). 
Having read or heard about resettlement on the riverfront itself, and then later being denied this right, 
people felt purposefully excluded and betrayed by the state. As Meenaben said on that October early 
morning by the River Sabarmati: “Modi threw us into the jungle.” For her, resettlement entailed not 
only diminished livelihood but also a sense of alienation, exclusion, and betrayal.  
 
Silent maneuverings 
Many of my research participants felt that the resettlement to Sadbhavna Nagar had deprived 
them of the benefits of development instead of making them beneficiaries. In April 2015, I interviewed 
Nehaben, a forty-five-year-old Sindhi housewife displaced from Kankaria Lake. She was very unhappy 
with the resettlement and did not hesitate to express her strong opinions about Modi, who had sent her 
from a “hi-fi area” to a “dirty locality”: 
Jelena: What do you think about the government? 
Nehaben: My opinion is very negative [laughing]. My opinion on the government is very negative. 
Narendra Modi has annihilated us. He discarded us in such a place—listen—he discarded us in such a 
chemically polluted area that poor people are bound to die in it! Our Kankaria was a hi-fi area. It was a hi-fi 
area. He removed us from there and gave us houses five kilometers away in a dirty locality like this. 
 
The feeling of having been betrayed by Modi and the government had also been translated into 
action, or, to perhaps put it more appropriately, into silent maneuvering or a refusal to cooperate. 
According to the allotment letters handed out by the municipal authority, the residents are supposed to 
pay their share of the house price, 67,860 rupees (ca. 953 USD), in installments over the course of ten 
years. After ten years, the property will be transferred into the beneficiary’s name, if all the payments 
have been made. However, most of the residents that I talked to stated quite forcefully that they did 
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not intend to pay the government. At the time of my fieldwork, four to six years had passed since the 
allotment of the apartments, and the residents had only paid the initial deposit of 3,000 to 8,000 rupees 
(ca. 43–112 USD) to receive apartment keys. This sum, in their view, was more than enough. People 
felt that they were entitled to get “a house for a house,” since their previous dwellings had been 
forcefully demolished. As Nehaben exclaimed: 
When he broke our houses, Narendra Modi, our house was there [in Kankaria], it was worth lākhs 
[hundreds of thousands] of rupees. And the land was worth karōrs [tens of millions] of rupees. He 
removed us from there. Now, then, why should we have to pay for this house? 
 
Like Nehaben, my interviewees considered the allotted flats merely to be compensation for the 
demolished houses rather than a manifestation of the government’s goodwill—providing resettlement 
housing was the least that the government could do for the poor after depriving them of their prime 
location homes. Moreover, many people of Sadbhavna Nagar had started modifying their houses, 
contrary to Rule 12 laid down by the municipal corporation in the allotment letters: “The beneficiary 
should keep the allocated building as it is at present. All maintenance charges will be paid by the 
beneficiary. No changes should be made to the building.”10 In Sadbhavna Nagar, hallways were turned 
into storage rooms, empty dwelling units into animal sheds, and common plots into outdoor kitchens 
and private backyards. The inner and outer walls of apartments were painted with pastel pinks, greens, 
and blues, and grilles were installed on the balconies, all in violation of policy guidelines. Through these 
material modifications, people strived to turn their homogenous apartments into homes through which 
to express personal identity (cf. Koster and Nuijten 2012). Also, those who had the financial means had 
moved out of the resettlement site, illegally selling or subletting their allotted apartment to relatives or 
acquaintances. Due to this, residents of Sadbhavna Nagar also included seasonal workers, beggars, 
illegal migrants, and other marginalized people who did not have the means to access the legal housing 
market. 
Resettled people’s material modifications, their practices of selling and subletting, as well as their 
refusal to pay for the apartments, can be described using Bayat’s (2013) notion of “quiet 
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encroachment.” Bayat (2013, 46) defines quiet encroachment as the “silent, protracted but pervasive 
advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or the public in order to survive and 
improve their lives.” This type of subaltern politics is largely individual, often invisible action that does 
not constitute a social movement or advance at the cost of other poor people (Bayat 2013). While the 
silent maneuverings of residents of Sadbhavna Nagar were not collective political acts but rather acts 
driven by individual needs and the will to survive, they were, nevertheless, collectively defended. People 
would, for example, inform each other of officers that turned up unexpectedly to check if the 
apartments had been illegally sold or rented out. There seemed to be a collective understanding among 
the residents that what they were doing was moral and justified. As Bayat (2013, 48) states: “A key 
attribute of quiet encroachment is that while advances are made quietly, individually, and gradually, the 
defense of their gains is often, although not always, collective and audible.” Through silent 
maneuverings, people subjected to betrayal cleverly responded to the perceived exclusion from the city, 
asserting their material right to make their future in the city.  
Bayat (2013) also acknowledges the possibility of the individual tactics of the subaltern to develop 
into public political action. The acts described in this paper have, indeed, the potential to transform 
into a public confrontation in case the AMC tries to evict the residents on the grounds that they refuse 
to pay their installments. Silent maneuverings, thus, contain a seed of a radical social movement. 
Further research is needed to find out what happens after ten years have passed since the allocation of 
houses, and the residents are supposed to have paid their share of the house price.   
 
Modi, development, and the empowering utopia 
Development is at the core of our governance. It is the solution to all problems. It is the way ahead to a 
dignified life. Development should be sustainable. It must serve as an opportunity for the poor to 
empower themselves.  
Narendra Modi at the laying of the Foundation Stone of the Chattrapati Shivaji Maharaj memorial in 
Mumbai (Modi 2016) 
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The Hindu nationalist BJP has managed to position itself as a party of development and progress—the 
party of the future. This has enabled it to appeal to the urban middle-class electorate without divorcing 
itself from the interests of lower-caste and Muslim constituencies. As Desai and Roy (2016, 1) point 
out, “The BJP has been particularly effective in linking ideas of development to mundane concerns 
about security, identity and spatial order.” This linkage was also present in resettled peoples’, especially 
Hindus’, opinions of Modi and the BJP-led government. The same people that blamed Modi for their 
unfavorable resettlement also admired and even praised him for bringing law and order to Gujarat, and 
for developing Ahmedabad into a clean mega city with world-class facilities.  
My Hindu interviewees commonly expressed discontent with displacement while supporting the 
world-class city project in general, as it was considered both a spatial manifestation of, and a means to 
development. For example, when I asked Pradeepbhai, a seventy-year-old retired gardener, what he 
thought about the new Kankaria Lakefront, he replied: “Earlier there was no infrastructure around the 
lake. After Modi, so many things have improved: rides, sitting spaces… and a hot-air balloon for flying. 
Even visually Kankaria is stunning.” Praadepbhai’s wife, Preetiben, agreed with her husband, praising 
Modi for building new roads after slum demolitions and for “helping the poor.” Pradeepbhai added: 
“People were thrown very far away, but Modi has done a good job.” Nevertheless, Pradeepbhai and 
Preetiben both felt that resettlement had not brought any positive changes to their own lives—on the 
contrary, it had caused difficulties in the form of increased expenses. Besides, even though they thought 
that the new house was “good,” they would have still preferred to live in their provisional (kaccā) hut by 
Kankaria Lake, “in the city.”  
Why then did Preetiben say that Modi has helped the poor? Instead of blaming Modi for 
displacement, the couple spoke very highly of him and the tangible improvements he had made in the 
city. It seemed that in their view, slum demolitions were well justified because of the project’s 
impressive result. I suggest that Pradeepbhai and Preetiben had internalized the world-class aesthetic 
discourse that regards slum removal as necessary for the development of the city and contributing to 
the greater good (Ghertner 2012, 1181; Berman 1983). This supports Rao’s (2016, 78) recent 
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contention that the poor, too, aspire for green and clean cities—the world-class city is not only the 
desire of the elite and the middle classes, or the result of the top-down implementation of policy. 
Pradeepbhai and Preetiben were trying to convince themselves of the project’s profitability for the poor 
and, in so doing, to hold on to the image of Modi as a generous benefactor. Pradeepbhai used the 
passive voice—“people were thrown very far away”—to avoid stating who had performed the act of 
betrayal. 
Yasminben, a Muslim housewife in her thirties, had been displaced from the Sabarmati 
Riverfront. When I asked her about what had happened there, she described how “they cleaned the 
place [by the river] and threw us in a camp.” By “camp” she was referring to the “interim resettlement 
site” of Ganeshnagar, next to the city’s garbage dump, where her family was forced to spend around six 
months in a hut before they were allotted a flat in Sadbhavna Nagar. Yasminben’s choice of words is 
noteworthy: when she said that the riverfront had been “cleaned,” she, in fact, likened the slums to dirt 
that has been physically removed in order to make space for something else. In other words, she 
conceived of her own home through the world-class aesthetic.  
The description given by Vimalben, a Hindu woman in her thirties, also utilized the story of how 
urban development contributes to the “greater good.” According to Vimalben, the new riverfront was a 
“good thing” (acchī bāt) in general, but it did not serve “people like us.” In Vimalben’s view, the new 
riverfront had been built to cater to the needs of foreigners. As she said, “I don’t like it. But it’s good; 
it’s good for you [foreign people].” Hence, displacement and resettlement appeared as unfortunate, 
albeit necessary, measures taken on the way to attaining the greater good: the world-class city as a 
symbol and a medium of a globally recognized, developed Ahmedabad.  
The ambivalent discourses of resettled people indicate that they were very conscious of the 
growing gap between the world-class image and their material reality. By using the passive voice and the 
third-person plural pronoun, my informants clung to the empowering utopia personified in the figure 
of Modi, striving to hide its dystopian shadow. Hence, I suggest that while the making of the world-
class city in Ahmedabad displaces the urban poor, it can, nevertheless, change their understanding of 
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themselves and strengthen their “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai 2004) by expanding the horizons of 
possible futures. In other words, the world-class city can be empowering by offering a material base in 
which to anchor one’s dreams. The proximity of the world-class city with its grandiloquent, “foreign-
looking” urban design was a source of national pride, even for the excluded. In what follows, I will 
illustrate how people in Sadbhavna Nagar strategically distanced themselves from “backward” qualities 
and landscapes to lay claim to a world-class future.  
 
“All the others are third-class citizens” 
On a February Sunday in 2016, I was sitting in an auto rickshaw on my way to the launch of 
Esther David’s new book Ahmedabad: City with a Past, being held at Crossword Bookstore in western 
Ahmedabad. I did not know the rickshaw driver, who was from Sadbhavna Nagar. Along the way, we 
started chatting, and the driver mentioned that he did not like living in the resettlement site because of 
the “low, third-class people” that live there. Significantly, he said two of these words, “third-class” and 
“low,” in English even though the rest of our conversation was in Hindi. I asked him if he knew some 
English, considering that he used those words. The driver seemed puzzled and answered: “No, no. 
Those are Gujarati words, very common Gujarati words.” “Fair enough,” I thought, and enquired what 
he meant by the term “third-class.” He replied that the word refers to people who use impolite 
language, pick fights, drink liquor, steal things, throw their garbage from their windows instead of using 
a garbage can, and try to haggle the price of auto rickshaw rides. My new acquaintance went on to say 
that he prefers to socialize with acche insān (good people) who talk politely and pay according to the 
meter rate. “Well,” I said, looking for the right words, “I think you can find many good people in 
Sadbhavna Nagar, don’t you think?” He disagreed and continued to say that good people are only 
found in the posh western neighborhoods of Satellite, Bopal, and Vastrapur. That is precisely the 
reason why he prefers to drive his rickshaw there instead of in the eastern part of the city, which he 
regarded as the abode of “low people.”  
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The terms that the driver used—“third-class” and “low”—are the same negative remarks that 
people from the neighboring middle-class area in Vatva use to characterize all the residents of the 
resettlement sites. In the manner of the driver, many of my interviewees expressed their wish to live in 
a “good, clean locality” or “in the city with good people,” not in a “slum” with “useless people” (bekār 
log) or “third-class people.” Instead of collectively contesting the middle-class nuisance talk, resettled 
slum-dwellers mirrored defaming representations and, thus, conflated urban citizenship with norms of 
consumerism and civility like the bourgeois. This is a strategic effort to distance oneself from “uncivil” 
or “backward” qualities of loudness, dirtiness, violence, illegality, and, ultimately, poverty, and to locate 
oneself on the side of development, on the side of good citizens who fit in the beautiful, clean spaces. 
However, mobilizing nuisance talk against each other, resettled people end up betraying their peers. 
Derogatory remarks along the lines of caste, religion or locality were often deployed. Upper-caste 
Hindus in particular had the habit of attributing littering, “bad language,” and the use of alcohol and 
drugs to the low-caste Vaghri and Devipujak communities. A young housewife, Nidhaben, for example, 
said that people in her block, all of whom were Hindus, were all right, but “all the others are third-class 
people” (bākī sab third-class log haĩ). When I asked what “third-class” meant for her, she answered that 
“those people keep on drinking and fighting.” In a puzzling manner, she later told me that her father-
in-law was also a big drinker and a frequent quarreler, but this did not make him “third-class.” It is clear 
then that “third-class” was not only a form of class positioning but also entailed implicit assumptions 
about caste (Frøystad 2006). Caste and class became enmeshed in derogatory comments employed by 
Sindhis and other upper-caste residents of Sabhavna Nagar.  
I usually asked residents what kinds of changes they would like to see in the area. A standard 
answer was that different social groups should be allotted separate areas. Kalpeshbhai, a Sindhi man in 
his forties, put it bluntly: “All the Vaghris should go.” According to him, Vaghris “don’t hesitate to 
fight or even hit someone with a knife.” Tejalben, a homemaker native to Rajasthan, shared 
Kalpeshbhai’s opinion. In her view, “lower castes” should be separated from others in order to reduce 
fights: “Separate places should be given so that there would be no fights. And then all these lower 
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castes, Vaghri... All those lower castes (nīchī jāti) fight a lot, and for that reason, those people, too, 
should be given a separate place.” 
In addition to Vaghris and Devipujaks, Muslims were also frequently spoken of as “low people,” 
not only by Sindhis but by other Hindu communities as well. Moreover, as I have shown above, 
Muslim-dominated areas were commonly referred to as Pakistan and regarded as dangerous areas. The 
use of the term Pakistan, specifically, to characterize the living areas of the Muslim minority is a 
practice that Shaban (2012) has previously referred to using the term “deterritorialization.” The 
Muslims of Sadbhavna Nagar were forced to bear the additional burden of deterritorialization from the 
metaphorical national space—they were not only “low people” but also “dangerous Pakistanis,” the 
doubly other, who have no place in the new, developed India. Muslims themselves tended to downplay 
the Hindu–Muslim segregation, emphasizing how “all are equal,” or how “everyone shares the same 
red blood,” attributing uncivil and immoral practices to people coming from different slums 
irrespective of their religion.  
 
Conclusions: The trail of betrayal 
The world-class city reflects the purity of the future-to-be invoking dreams, desires, and aspirations in 
urban dwellers. Not just the elites and the middle classes, but the poor, too, want to be included in the 
world-class city and the progress, development, and bright future that it promises. In this paper, I have 
shown how world-class city interventions and imaginaries in contemporary Ahmedabad resulted in a 
sense of betrayal among the urban poor, who were both spatially and discursively excluded from 
development. People displaced by large-scale urban redevelopment felt betrayed by the state, and 
especially by Prime Minister Modi, whom they saw as the embodiment of a globally recognized, 
developed India that strongly resonated with their values and aspirations. My informants fiercely 
criticized Modi and the government for “throwing” them into the “jungle,” for excluding them from 
the world-class city. Their everyday lives in this jungle, among unwanted neighbors, constituted a stark 
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contradiction to the spectacular futurism of the world-class city and aggravated their sense of having 
been betrayed—for them, the promised future never arrived. The everyday socio-materiality in the 
urban margins constantly reminded them of their relegated “third-class” status in the world-class city.  
However, rather than accepting their marginal position, resettled people espoused ideas of 
civility, morality, and cleanliness in an effort to claim belonging, public recognition, and a positive self-
understanding. To counter the perceived exclusion from the world-class city, my informants used the 
tropes of third-class people and low people, influenced by middle-class nuisance talk (Ghertner 2012), 
to characterize their new, unwanted neighbors that belonged to different religious, caste- and locality-
based groups. The ubiquitous practices of othering prevented the formation of horizontal solidarity 
among the urban poor.  
Finally, people’s discursive practices of denigration manifest in how betrayal by the state trickles 
down and comes to reinforce the pre-existing inequalities of caste and religion at the micro level. 
Following the trail of betrayal, I have shown that Muslims and low-caste Hindus living in marginal 
spaces were positioned at the bottom of the social hierarchy of the world-class city. These communities 
were not only betrayed by the state but also by their neighbors aspiring for social mobility.  
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Notes
                                                             
1 Parts of this article have been previously published as “Differentiated Citizenship, Displacement, and 
Materiality in State–Citizen Relations in Ahmedabad.” PhD Thesis. Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä.  
2 English words used in what were otherwise Hindi sentences before translation into English are 
italicized when they appear in the text for the first time.   
3 All the names of interviewees are pseudonyms. 
4 As Mahadevia (2007) notes, the city of Ahmedabad has a long history of Hindu–Muslim tensions and 
each incident of inter-community violence has led to an increased level of intra-city migration. In 2002 
Hindu–Muslim violence reached an unprecedented level; during the riots of March–May 2002, two 
thousand Muslims were killed and 200,000 had to flee from their homes in the aftermath of the 
Sabarmati Express train-burning incident. The train was carrying Hindu pilgrims returning from 
Ayodhya and it was reported to have been attacked and set alight by Muslims. The government of 
Gujarat, especially Narendra Modi and the BJP have been accused of an inability to control the violent 
outbursts following the train burning. The National Human Rights Commission has posited that there 
was state government conformity and even direct participation in the targeted, selective violence against 
Muslims (Mahadevia 2007). 
5 During my fieldwork, I lived in a middle-class housing estate located right next to the resettlement 
site, which enabled me to socialize with residents of Sadbhavna Nagar on a daily basis. Our interaction 
varied from casual afternoon tea breaks to detailed interviews, from all-night garba dance parties to 
visits to people’s workplaces. The data of this paper consists of informal discussions, observations of 
everyday activities (recorded in the form of field notes and photographs), and 51 semi-structured 
interviews with residents of Sadbhavna Nagar (33 with Hindus, 17 with Muslims, one with both Hindu 
and Muslim residents). Some of the interviews were one-on-one encounters, while others took the 
form of group discussions. All the interviews were conducted in Hindi/Urdu, which was either the 
mother tongue or the second language of the interviewees.   
6 Sindhis considered themselves to be the highest-ranking caste in the area. Sindhis of Sadbhavna Nagar 
were the offspring of refugees displaced from the Sindh province during the Partition of British India 
in 1947. In Ahmedabad, they were rehabilitated in refugee camps, one of which was set on private land 
next to Kankaria Lake. Sindhi presence was clearly visible in the resettlement site as the Sindhis had 
collectively constructed a temple dedicated to their community god, Jhūlelāl. Economically, too, the 
Sindhis were relatively well-off, many men having a regular job in the textile industry or as auto 
rickshaw drivers. Vaghris and Devipujaks, for their part, were regarded as the lowest Hindu castes in 
Sadbhavna Nagar. They often worked as informal hawkers and vendors selling flowers, vegetables, and 
fruit. Vaghris had been resettled to Sadbhavna Nagar from various neighborhoods by the Sabarmati 
River and Kankaria Lake while Devipujaks had lived by the Sabarmati. Of all the Hindu castes, Sindhis 
and Vaghris were the most numerous.  
7 The INC, commonly known as Congress, is one of the two major political parties in India. The party 
lost much of its support in the general elections of 2014. 
8 The Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) is a government-owned corporation 
under the administrative control of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation. 
9 In the Indian general elections of 2014, the Hindu nationalist BJP, led by Modi, won all the 26 
parliamentary seats in Gujarat, and in the municipal elections of 2015, the BJP won 142 out of 192 
seats in Ahmedabad. 
10 The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation: allocation letter received by a former resident of Kankaria 
dated 28 March, 2011. 
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Figure 1. The resettlement site of Sadbhavna Nagar, May 2015.  
Figure 2. The new walkway by the Sabarmati River, March 2015.   
Figure 3. Map of slum resettlement sites located in Vatva, January 2016.  
Figure 4. Many residents have personalized their apartments by painting the walls with bright colors, 
May 2015.  
Figure 5. The material reality in the resettlement site provides a stark contrast to the world-class city 
landscape, January 2016.  
 
